and Russian nuclear arsenals, but its doctrine is based on an emphasis on strategic ambiguity and a reluctance to engage in transparency measures. China’s nuclear arsenal is, today, comparatively smaller than the U.S. The P3 will also need to establish a strategy to address Russia’s role in the international system as it continues to use its influence to disrupt multilateral institutions.Īt the same time, China continues to pose a growing challenge to the P3 due to its nuclear buildup and increasingly aggressive behavior in the Pacific. While the stance does not need to be identical across the P3, messages from Washington, London, and Paris should not contradict each other. Most importantly, the P3 will need to establish a coherent deterrence messaging strategy. ![]() ![]() Participants highlighted the need to nuance the conversation about deterrence failure, as NATO’s deterrence has not failed. As the war continues without a clear end in sight, however, the P3 and NATO will need to consider and develop a long-term strategy for deterring Russia and for responding to potential future threats of Russian nuclear escalation, as well as a long-term view of European security. In fact, the P3 have used signaling and messaging to limit escalation, including the United States’ decision to delay an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in the spring of 2022. None of the P3 publicly increased the alert status of their nuclear weapons in response to Putin’s threats and declaration that Russian strategic forces would go on a special alert status. In response to these nuclear threats, the P3 have responded in ways designed to prevent further escalation. Although President Putin was supposedly not part of the conversation, the fact that it occurred at all at senior levels in the Russian military increases concerns over Russian intentions regarding the use of a tactical nuclear weapon. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was accompanied by explicit nuclear threats, with Russian president Vladimir Putin stating, “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will without doubt use all available means to protect Russia and our people-this is not a bluff.” In addition, in late 2022, Russian military leaders actually discussed the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine also reinforces the enduring importance of close collaboration and solidarity between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France as responsible nuclear weapons states and NATO alliance members. Moreover, the ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia’s blatant nuclear saber-rattling drive home the inescapable risks of war that occur under a nuclear shadow. While the three nations have unique perspectives and policies regarding nuclear issues and the nature of today’s security environment, as the three nuclear weapons states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, they play a unique and enduring role in the stewardship of international alliances and partnerships, especially in matters of nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, and arms control. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France hold common values and principles directed toward a shared purpose of sustaining global peace and security, as well as an understanding of their respective roles as responsible stewards of the nuclear order. In 2022, the group’s discussion addressed a range of growing challenges in the international security environment, prompting the group’s Track 2 participants to issue this statement reflecting their consensus after two rounds of meetings. ![]() All signatories agree to this statement in their personal capacities, which may not represent the views of their respective organizations. Since the dialogues’ inception, currently serving senior officials from all three governments have also routinely participated in the discussions.Įach year the Track 2 members of the group issue a consensus statement reflecting their discussions. The majority of the experts are former U.S., UK, and French senior officials the others are well-known academics in the field. By identifying issues of mutual concern and areas of consensus, the group seeks to improve collaboration and cooperation among the three nations across a range of challenging nuclear policy concerns. The European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), have convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (P3) since 2009 to discuss nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation policy issues.
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